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1.   INTRODUCTION
Whether mergers and acquisitions (M&A) create economic values is a 
central question in corporate finance and strategy. In answering this ques-
tion, finance theory usually considers shareholder wealth as the primary 
objective because shareholders are the residual owners of the firm and 
assumes that a focus on shareholder value yields an efficient evaluation crite-
rion. A large number of event studies have analyzed short-term shareholder 
wealth effects since the 1970s. The approach hinges on the assumption that 
an M&A announcement brings new information to the market, such that 
investors’ expectations about the firm’s prospects are updated and reflected 
in the share prices. An abnormal return at announcement equals the differ-
ence between the realized returns and an expected (benchmark) return, 
which would be generated in case the takeover bid would not have taken 
place.
Some researchers examine announcement period returns for the acquirer 
and target combined as well as announcement period returns for acquirers 
and targets. Analyzing announcement period returns on a combined basis is 
academically important because it can capture the market’s expectation 
about the future prospect of the merging firms. As shown in Table 1, prior 
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studies report statistically significant, positive abnormal announcement 
returns for the acquirer and target combined (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; 
Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001; Graham, 
Lemmon and Wolf, 2002; Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah, 2005). Turning 
to M&A between Japanese firms, most prior studies analyze announcement 
period returns only for acquirers. A notable exception is a study by Inoue 
and Kato (2003), which examines 144 transactions between 1990 and 2002 and 
reports statistically significant, positive announcement period abnormal 
returns for acquirers and targets. However, Inoue and Kato (2003)’s analysis 
does not include announcement period returns for the acquirer and target 
combined, and thus, we do not know whether M&A between Japanese firms 
create the combined value of merging firms.
This paper aims to fill this research gap. I examine announcement period 
returns for 77 transactions between public Japanese firms completed between 
2000 and 2005.
2.   SAMPLE AND DATA
Sample
This study’ sample consists of 77 mergers and acquisitions between pub-
lic Japanese firms in the 2000-2005 period. The sample is constructed to be 
Table 1:  Summary of Studies on Announcement Period Abnormal Returns for the 
Acquirer and Target combined
Sample Acquirer
CAR
Target
CAR
Combined 
CARYear N
Kaplan et al. (1992) 1971-1982 209 － S ＋ S ＋ S
Mulherin et al. (2000) 1990-1998 376 － IS ＋ S ＋ S
Andrade et al. (2000) 1973-1998 3,688 － IS ＋ S ＋ S
Graham et al. (2002) 1980-1995 356 － S ＋ S ＋ S
Bhagat et al. (2005) 1962-2001 1,018 ＋ IS ＋ S ＋ S
S: Statistically significant; IS: Statistically insignificant
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free of post-M&A contaminating events such as M&A of subsidy firms by 
their parent firms and minority equity participation.
Announcement period abnormal returns
Following Brown and Warner (1985), I use the modified market model to 
estimate abnormal stock returns for acquirers and targets. I do not use the 
market model mainly because transactions took place less than eighty days 
out of one hundred trading days prior announcement for about one fourth of 
the sample firms. Closing share prices are not available for these firms, and 
using the market model for this kind of samples may bias results of analyses. 
I calculate daily abnormal returns (AR) for a firm by deducting the value-
weighted index returns from the firm’s return:
ARit  Rit  Rmt,
where Rit is firm i ’s daily stock return on date t and Rmt is the return for the 
value-weighted TOPIX (a index of Tokyo Stock Exchange) return on date t. I 
calculate abnormal returns for two event windows around the announcement 
date: three-day event windows (from one day prior the announcement date to 
one day after the announcement date) and five-day event windows (from two 
days prior the announcement date to two days after the announcement date). 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated by summing the 
abnormal returns over the two event windows.
I then compute the aggregate CAR for the acquirer and target. This 
combined CAR is the weighted average of CAR for the acquirer and target, 
where the weight is the market value of equity of the firms two days prior to 
the announcement date for the three-day event window and three days prior 
to the announcement date for the five-day window. I adjust the weight for 
the target for the percentage of its shares held by the acquirer prior to the 
announcement.
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3.   RESULTS
Table 2 displays announcement period abnormal returns for acquirers 
and targets as well as for the acquirer and target combined. The results indi-
cate that both acquirers and targets, on average, earn statistically significant, 
positive announcement period abnormal returns. The results also provide 
empirical evidence that the mean announcement period abnormal returns for 
the acquirer and target combined is positive and statistically significant.
The mean CAR over the three-day window and five-day window for 
acquirers are 3.09% and 3.01%. The mean CAR over the three-day window 
and five-day window for targets are 1.71% and 2.69%. These results are simi-
lar to those of Inoue and Kato (2003)’s study, which reports a 1.8% abnormal 
return for acquirers and a 3.7% abnormal return for targets in their sample 
of completed transactions, in that both studies show significant positive 
abnormal returns. The results of the two studies differ in two ways. First, 
the abnormal returns for acquirers are higher in this study’s sample than in 
their sample. Second, the abnormal returns for targets are lower in this 
study’s sample than in their sample.
Turning to the primary interest of this study, the mean CAR over the 
three-day window and five-day window for the acquirer and target combined 
are 1.96% and 1.94%. These figures are close to that of Andrade et al. (2001)’s 
study, which analyzes M&A between U.S. firms and reports a 1.8% abnormal 
Table 2: Announcement Period Abnormal Returns for Sample Firms
CAR3
(t1, t1)
CAR5
(t2, t2)
Acquirer 3.09% *** 3.01% ***
Target 1.71% ** 2.69% **
Combined 1.96% ** 1.94% **
N 77 77
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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return over three-day window for the acquirer and target combined. The 
median equity market value for the acquirer and target combined was about 
61.4 billion yen in my sample, such that a 1.96% announcement period abnor-
mal return corresponds to a 1.20 billion yen increase in the market value of 
merging firms.
CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed announcement returns for recent M&A 
between public Japanese firms. I find in my sample that both the acquirers’ 
shareholders and the targets’ shareholders earn positive abnormal returns at 
announcement and that the total announcement wealth effects are positive 
and significant.
Analysis can be extended in several ways. One possible avenue is to 
examine the relationship between wealth effects at announcement and subse-
quent changes in operating performance. Operating performance studies 
attempt to identify the sources of gains from M&A and to determine the 
expected gains at announcement are ever actually realized. These studies 
generally focus on accounting measures such as operating cash flow margins 
and return on assets. If the market’s expectation about the prospect of 
acquirers and targets eventually shows up in operating performance changes 
of merged firms, there will be a significant, positive relationship between the 
market’s assessment of the changes and the actual operating performance 
changes. Empirical research on this issue has been limited. Notable examples 
are studies by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) and Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2001), both of which find a significant positive relationship between 
announcement period abnormal returns for the acquirer and target combined 
and subsequent operating performance changes of the merged firms.
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